

Abaza-pasha and his unsuccessful campaign to Kamyanets-Podilsky in 1633

The article covers the biography of Mehmet Abaza-pasha – a prominent statesman and military leader, and the war he unleashed against the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1633. The author traces principal events of the war in chronological sequence, and ascertains the circumstances which caused Abaza-pasha's defeat.

Key words: *Abaza-pasha, military operations, polish-turkish relations, correspondence.*

Fairly little is known of once famous Mehmet Abaza-pasha. Generally, the historians confine themselves to a brief biographical reference. The only exception is a Polish historian Lech Pidhorodetsky, who devoted a big article and a part of his monograph, dedicated to the great Hetman StanislavKonetspolsky of Rzeczpospolita, to Abaza-pasha's campaign. Since that time, however, some new sources have been revealed, in particular, AgneshkaBedzhytska, a Polish specialist in the study of early texts, has published a basic collection of Konetspolsky's correspondence, which makes it possible to throw more light on Abaza-pasha's personality and his policy regarding the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. For searching convenience, we give references to the respective pages of this archeographical work directly in the text, in brackets.

Mehmet Abaza-pasha was born, evidently, in 1580s. Judging by his soubriquet – “Abaza” – the historians consider this historical personality to be an Abkhazian, or at least coming from Abkhazia. Not always, however, a soubriquet may be considered a reliable guideline in such cases, which, incidentally, can be proved by the family name of the Ukrainian Cossack clan of Abazes or the surname of one of the leaders of antipolish insurrection in 1702 AndriyAbazyn.

Another reliable evidence is the classics of Polish historiography and literature of the baroque epoch by Samuel Twardovsky (died in 1661), who created a famous

epic poem-chronicle “WojnaDomowa” describing the events of the National Liberation war of the Ukrainians in 1648-1654, along with a number of other works, one of the most prominent of which is “Przewaznaleyacyja...” (1633) – a poetic account of Prince KryshtofZbarazky’s official visit to Istanbul (1622-1623), in which Twardovsky himself took part as a secretary. The poet-chronicler had always been interested in the Oriental countries and their mutual relations with the Christian Europe. He was one of the first Polish historiographers who appealed to a most burning issue of that day – the renegades, and defined the main reason of this phenomenon – the plundering raids of the Golden Horde on the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The difficult conditions forced part of the captured to convert to Islam; some of these people achieved high rank in the Osman Empire. Twardovsky’s attention was drawn by the fates of famous Roxolana and Mehmet Abaza-pasha, writing about whom, he used not only general sources, but also some unknown ones, probably oral testimonies. So, Mehmed-pasha, as Twardovsky indicated, was of Russian-Ukrainian origin, came from Podillya, and his Christian name was Ivan (the Turks called him Abaza). An indirect proof of it may also be the fact that that Abaza-pasha was well-acquainted with the Gospel, which had been observed by Polish-Lithuanian ambassador in Turkey Alexander Tshebinsky (p.266). For a long period of time Abaza had been sailing with the high-ranking official of the Ottoman Empire Hali-pasha (Halil-pasha) and had a number of voyages through the Aegean sea. Twardovsky characterized Ivan-Abaza as an immensely energetic, strong and courageous man, the tallest of the galley crew; he was so strong he could push the galley into the water from the shore on his own. Ivan enjoyed the Turks’ confidence, later he was made a Turk by Hali-pasha, and for his services (evidently in the war against Iran) during the rule of sultan Osman II he was appointed the pasha (or rather vice-regent) of the city and province of Erzurum (the modern Erzurum is situated in the northeastern part of Turkey). Other sources state that Ivan (who had already become by that time Abaza-pasha) participated in the Hotyn war of 1621, and held the post of the vice-regent of Erzurum in 1622-1628. In fact, later (in 1634) Abaza-pasha spoke slightly of Osman II, considering him a

young and unexperienced person, unaware that his viziers suppressed the truth, as opposed to sultan Murad IV – “wise, reasonable and warlike” (p. 223). In November 1622 Abaza stirred up a rebellion which involved the Asian provinces of the Ottoman Empire and was, probably, somehow connected to an assassination of Osman II and Mustafa I’s coming to a throne of a sultan (he reigned in 1617-1618 and 1622-1623). When the janissaries and the spahis of Erzurum refused to let Abaza-pasha into the city, he called the Persian forces to his assistance, took the city by a sudden storm at night and destroyed three thousand janissaries so that the river Araks was red with blood. Those who survived saved themselves by fleeing to Istanbul and there, at the end of November 1622, tried to incite the leader of janissaries and the Grand Vizier Gurdzha Mehmed-pasha to a campaign against the mutinous pasha. At last they limited themselves to sending a capidgi-pasha (the head of guard of the sultan palace) to Erzurum in 1623, where he managed to pacify the rebels for a while. Eventually, the rebellion flared up with a renewed vigor. Abaza-pasha made some marches to Diyarbakir in November 1628, threatened Anatolia and Tabriz, in which the janissaries blamed Hali-pasha. The latter tried to incline his renegade to loyalty to the sultan. And at this point Twardovsky breaks off his story. According to another sources, above everything, the Tugi chronicle, in 1628 Abaza-pasha was defeated, capitulated, but was remitted by the sultan Murad IV (who reigned in 1623-1640) and was appointed the baylerbey (baglerbey), which means vice-regent, of Bosnia. At the beginning of 1630s Abaza-pasha fell into disgrace, but since May 1632 had become only a sanjackbey, i.e. the chief of district Silistra on the northwestern coast of Black sea. The centre of this province (eyalet) of the Ottoman Empire was the fortress city Silistra (nowadays the city in northeastern Bulgaria, situated on the right bank of the river Danube at a very border with Romania).

It is known that Abaza-pasha had a sister. Her son (Abaza-pasha’s nephew) Ipsyr-bey was injured on 22 October 1633 during the battle of the Turks with the crown forces in the environs of Kamyanets-Podilsky. The great crown getman Stanislav Konetspolsky in his letter to the king Vladyslav IV called him “a

young man of a great energy” and thought he had been killed in this battle. Meanwhile, Ipsyr-pasha survived and had been holding the post of a pasha of Buda (now Budapest) till 1639, and later – the pasha of Silistra; he was the one with whom a well-known diplomat and memoirist of Rzeczpospolita Wojciech Myaskivsky (deceased in 1654) negotiated in June 1640; the latter had held a post of a steward’s assistant in Podillya since 1621, then since 1625 – a steward in Podillya, and since 1637 – Lviv pidkomoria. During the rule of sultan Ibrahim I (1640-1648) Izmyr defeated Varvar-pasha, but later himself stirred up an insurrection against the sultan. After his defeat, he returned to Istanbul, where he was put to death. It’s quite possible that a fairly well-known Turkish commander, a bey of Damascus, who fought in a war against the forces of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the battle of Vienna in 1683, may be Abaza-pasha’s relative.

The further activity of Abaza-pasha can be researched quite thoroughly due to the aforesaid publication of S. Konetpolsky’s correspondence, which went on about the activities of the pasha of Silistra quite often and even contained some of his letters. So, in May 1632 Yusuf, the caymacan (i.e. the deputy of the Grand Vizier) of Silistra, informed S. Konetpolsky that a new chief Mehmed Abaza-pasha was going to come to Silistra and replace vizier Murtaza-pasha (governor Ochakov). At the same time Abaza-pasha put himself on the map as well by sending a letter to Konetpolsky from Nikopolis, situated on the right bank of Danube (in the northern part of modern Bulgaria). He informed of his peaceful intentions towards Rzeczpospolyta, in particular, of his intention to set a Polish nobleman Meleshko and four of his comrades free from Turkish captivity (in return the pasha asked to release one of the sultans), of an official visit headed by “an old **capidgi** of mine – Ali-pasha, the aga of the Silistrian castle” (p. 104). At the end of July – beginning of August 1632 Abaza-pasha wrote another letter to Konetpolsky, in which he informed of a raid of the Nogaimorza (the leader of the Horde of Belgorod) Kantymyr on Pokuttya and Moldova in May 1632 and a following sultan’s “emir” (decree), which enjoined to release all prisoners captured during that raid. The fact that the pasha himself couldn’t

hold the Nogai raid back, was accounted for by the ruler of Silistra that at the time when he raid took place he hadn't yet got hold of his "ochakov state"; he also sent his spokesman to Rzechpospolyta along with Meleshko (p. 109)

Meanwhile, the situation in the Eastern Europe has worsened. At the beginning of October 1632 Muscovy attempted to win Smolensk from Rzechpospolyta and at the same time seized 24 towns in Severia. By January 1633 the forces of Muscovy had taken also Starodub, Romny, Baturyn, Myrhorod, a number of Belorussian towns, besieged Smolensk. To free the city from invaders, king Vladyslav IV with a powerful army took the field, with an immense help from the Zaporizhian Cossacks. The Ottoman Empire, incited to war by Muscovy, decided to take advantage of a rather difficult condition of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The Turkish ruling groups had different views on further orientations of foreign policy: one of the groups (headed by Abaza-pasha) strived for war while the other (headed by Murtaza-pasha) – preferred peace, especially as there was a threat of war with Iran. The ambiguous policy occurred also in the Crimean Khanate, where khan JanibegGeray and the morza of the Belgorodian horde Kantymyr were fighting for influence, the first being the enemy of Muscovy and supporting the union with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and the second – vice versa. Sultan Murad IV, an experienced and vigorous politician, displayed an utterly reasonable caution by giving only an unofficial consent for Abaza-pasha's campaign, so that he could announce him as a person responsible for disturbance of peace in case of a failure. The pasha agreed to this, willing also to renew his influence at court. Rzechpospolyta abided then by the peace treaty rather carefully and didn't allow massive marches of the Cossacks to the Black sea, but it couldn't stop small "voyages" of the Zaporizhyans, and, moreover, turned a blind eye to the fact that the Cossacks were founding small fortresses ("palankas") along the banks of the Dniester, which gave a wishful pretext for the Ottoman Empire to start a war.

In about March 1633 Abaza-pasha was staying in Rushchuk (a modern city of Ruse in Bulgaria on the right bank of the Danube opposite the Romanian city Giur-

giu). From there he informed Konetspolsky of the start of the war of Smolensk and of Cossacks' raid to the town Tulork (Turkeli), situated on the Black sea coast in Anatolia. Abaza-pasha gave the Poles a promise to execute a will of the sultan and suppress Kantymyr-morza, but the change in his attitude could be already sensed in his letters (an obvious threat to revenge on Poland-Lithuania for the activity of the Cossacks) (p. 114-116). He decided to start a war at his own peril, relying on the support of the Turkish rulers of Rumeli and Bosnia, among which he had a great influence. An occasion for tthe attack was supposed to be the Cossack business. Though the Cossacks had conducted raids upon the Ottoman Empire earlier, it was this moment that Abaza-pasha decided to draw attention to it. He also emphasized the problem of the Cossacks' "palankas" along the Dniester and demanded they were demolished, but the response he received from the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was negative. Konetspolsky felt the danger and by no means trusted pasha's assurances of goodwill. Through the Moldovian ruler Myron Barnavsky he intended to find out more about the true intentions of the Turks. Incidentally, Abaza-pasha visited the Moldovian ruler in May 1633 and, in his turn, probed the possibility of the Moldovian forces taking part in the war against Rzeczpospolita (p. 116-117). The cunning Abaza saw the intentions of Barnavsky and by his intrigues finally brought him to a scaffold in Istanbul. The new ruler – Moses Mohyla (he was at the Moldovian throne in 1630-1631, from July 1633 till April 1634) – was commanded to prepare for a march with Abaza-pasha and didn't dare contradict (p. 125-126). Konetspolsky sent his representatives to the pasha as well. One of them returned by 22 June and reported that the pasha had been complaining about the Cossacks' raids (p. 121-122). The Polish intelligence service started working at full capacity. One of the agents wrote from Istanbul on 22 June that the Turks had been already gathering volunteers ready to participate in Abaza-pasha's campaign. The agent also reported on the Moscovian ambassadors O. Pronchyshev and T. Bormosov, followed by J. Dashkov an M. Somov instigating the Turks to war (p. 120-121). Beyond doubt, the crown hetman knew

perfectly well of the role of the Moscovian diplomacy in this business as well as the role of the Greeks who had been so easily used by Muscovy.

In June 1633 the Nogaian horde led by Kantymyr conducted a vigorous raid to Podillya. The khan of Crimea didn't do as Abaza-pasha had told him and started a campaign against Muscovy. The military command of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth didn't have time to react properly to Kantymyr's activities, though Konetspolsky managed to crush part of the horde in the environs of SasovyRih, which was observed even in Italian newspapers and booklets. This raid showed true intentions of Abaza-pasha, and at the beginning of July 1633 Konetspolsky already had a clear view of the Turks' preparing for the raid and, having notified king Vladyslav IV, took a number of measures. The king himself sent, without losing a moment, his ambassador Alexander Tshebinsky from Wilno to Turkey on 25 July, trying to preserve peace (p. 185). But with fresh reports of the diplomats and agents, Konetspolsky was yet again persuaded that the war was inevitable, and he commanded to build a camp in Kamynets-Podilsky and provide the town with food and ammunition. The agent in Crimea reported that a Turkish chaush (a courtier) had received from the sultan, along with his symbols of authority, an order to come to the aid to Abaza-pasha, who had by that time send a number of "chaikas" (the Cossacks' boats) from the Danube to Ochakiv to convey the forces of the horde, had arrived in Silistra and intended to go to Kiliya from there. The only issue that remained uncertain was the direction from where the Turks would attack: either from Ochakiv (it would be the lesser of two evils, for in this case the Turks would start building fortifications), or from Ackerman or Kiliya. Konetspolsky with the main forces stayed in Bar, so that he could redeploy, if needed, a part of the forces to a danger zone. The crown hetman was up to the mark, having detected the right direction of the Turks' attack: to Kamyanets-Podilsky, though it could be another object as well – Rashkiv (p. 126-127, 138). On 14 August Konetspolsky decided to move towards the Turks from Bar to Cotiuzhany. He then wrote to the king, referring to the information obtained from herald Ilich, that Abaza-pasha had already crossed the Danube near Silistra on about

10 August and that the Moldovian and Wallachian armies had joined him, which were supposed to cross the borders of Rzeczpospolita that very month (p.130). Before long pasha was already in Galati (according to the other information it was only on 21 September), which he was supposed to leave as soon as the army led by Bayram-pasha (he was a caymacan, i.e. the deputy of the Grand Vizier, in 1633-1635, and later – the Grand Vizier from February 1637 till 1638). There Abaza-pasha again forced the Valas troops to come together . On 23 September he inspected the army which had come to him from Babadag (this town is situated not far from the Black sea coast, nowadays it's the grounds of Romania) and on 24 September he started a trip to Tsetsora near Jasi. He followed the track of sultan Osman II back in 1621, which means they went along the right bank of the river Prut, where there were nine strongholds, every one of which was stocked with provision according to the governor's order. The ambassador of Muscovy, who had incited him to war, had been for some time on his side as well. Abaza-pasha wanted to strike a sudden blow to Rzeczpospolita, so he planned to leave the trains in Tsetsora or somewhere on the Prut. But it became clear that the Turks had lost the initiative, because the assembly of the forces had taken despairingly longer than planned. During the final period of the trip Abaza-pasha was joined by new detached forces from Rumeli, Dobrogea, and even from Istanbul, and three more pashas arrived on their galleys. The sly Kantymyrmorza refused to join Abaza-pasha, wishing to act on his own, and indeed left Ackerman later than planned. Finally, Abaza-pasha sent the morza along the banks of the Dniester to the North so that the latter devastated the Polish-Lithuanian grounds on his way (p.147-148). Abaza-pasha was actually forced to follow Osman II's path along the Prut instead of going along the Dniester, as it was broiling hot in this region; Konetpolsky said that the heat "had turned the ground into ashes", the streams had dried up and everyone could feel an acute shortage in provision. So the pasha was forced to abandon the scheduled path and travel along the Prut to Hotyn, following the track of Osman II, whose campaign resulted in a defeat... Even now, however, the army advanced too slowly. The reasons for this are obvious: the drought and lack of

willing of the Moldovians and Wallachs to spill their blood in the war against the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth they didn't see the meaning in at all. Moreover, the Turkish army, speaking in a present way, had been stuck at the start and began the trip too late (they'd better end the raid when it was getting colder, not just start it). As bad would have it, the Bairam was celebrated that year on 5 October, which meant that the Turks would lose another three days because of the feast.

During the trip, Konetspolsky received a letter from Abaza-pasha, written before 16 September. In the letter he informed that Borutsky, the Polish ambassador to the sultan, was forced to leave (?) Silistra. Yet again the pasha complained about the Cossacks' actions on the Black sea and tried, however clumsily, to present himself as a supporter of piece with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth; he assured that he was acting by the sultan's order, who forced him to take drastic measures (though the pasha never used a word "war" in his letter) (p. 142-143). The hetman knew the worth of the pasha's assurance of his peaceful intentions – their "cunning enemy", who had gained among the Poles the name of "a malicious and sly dog" who "not in the least could be trusted". Yet another proof of this was given to him by JanushArmser – the ambassador of the Transylvanian ruler George I Rakoczi. The latter had informed of Abaza-pasha's bellicosity and added that the crown forces could defeat him only by outnumbering his army (p. 144). However, Konetspolsky pretended to believe in Abaza-pasha's peaceful intentions and sent to him Sulishevsky – a nobleman from his khorugv (a military unit), with a spying mission rather than diplomatic (p. 145-146).

Abaza-pasha already drew nearer to Tsetsora, having, according to three times exaggerated facts given by the Poles, 80-thousand-strong army (not counting the forces of the horde), including 7 thousand janissaries, seymens and darabanis, more than forty small and six large cannons. It was way less than Abaza-pasha had planned to take on a trip, nevertheless, even these forces were enough to constitute a serious menace to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth which was fighting on two fronts. Particular danger came from the horde forces, who were used to take actions against the crown forces. Konetspolsky could oppose to the Turks only a little over ten

thousand people and a Zaporizhyan regiment of 1250 Cossacks in addition to that, which, though, possessed an advantage in artillery. Besides, Konetspolsky himself had way more talent of a military leader and a lot more experience than Abaza-pasha.

The crown hetman with his army moved through Luchinets to Kamyanets-Podilsky, in order to save the town from the attack of the enemy, which was expected in the nearest future. By 8 October he had already achieved his goal, having forestalled the enemy (p. 149-151). The hetman set himself to the camp, the location of which had proved to be chosen utterly well: it was situated southwards of the town so that its right wing and rear faced the Smotrych canyon, and its southern and eastern sides were protected by earthworks. Moreover, a fort with four bastions was built in the left wing, in which carefully disguised artillery was hidden. Between the rampart and the fort there had been built three small forts, each having four bastions as well. L. Pidhorodetsky defined, where one or another commander of Rzeczpospolitya was located with his regiments: Zharnovetsky's unit had the fort; the voyevoda (governor) of Bratslav Stanislav Pototsky made the left part of the defensive front, and the Zaporizhyan Cossacks were located on the left; closer to the centre there were the forces which belonged to the crown Prince Janush Vyshnevetsky (his nephew, the infamous Yarema Vyshnevetsky, was also there), and farther, closer to Stanislav Pototsky, stood the mayor of Kamyanets-Podilsky Mykola Pototsky; the second defence front was provided by the warriors of Konetspolsky himself and the army of the voyevoda of Kyiv Janush Tyshkevych, behind which stood the mayor of Kalush Lukash Zholkevsky; the weakest of all, the left wing (closer to the town) was held by the forces under command of the mayor of Zhydachiv Jan Odgyvolsky, margrave Vladyslav Myshkovsky and a Russian voyevoda Stanislav Liubomyrsky along with, apparently, some units of Prince Vyshnevetsky.

Obviously, the hetman had seen to the Kamyanets-Podilsky's defence capability as well, for it was well provided with ammunition, ladders etc. Besides, the Dniester, notwithstanding the drought, was a serious obstacle to the enemy even at the crossings. Nevertheless, Konetspolsky wanted to use the slightest chance of ending up

in peace, so he wrote to the Moldavian ruler Moses Mohyla (whom he regarded as his ally and used him as a negotiator with Abaza-pasha (p. 151-152, 157-158), sent Grotovsky, and then Veloveysky to negotiate with the pasha and the Wallachian ruler (p. 160-161). Mohyla raised a question about concluding of peace and releasing the Polish ambassadors Borutsky and Sulishevsky, but Abaza-pasha gave an evasive answer to that (p. 155-156). According to the rumor, which Konetspolsky told the king in a letter, Abaza-pasha was supposed to stay on 13 October between Tsetsora and Dziezha (the right tributary of the Prut, which flows into it in Sasiv Yar), not far from the Aronov bridge, but it wasn't known exactly, when and where he would strike, and whether he acted on his own accord or by the sultan's order (p.152-154). In his letter to the king of 15 October Konetspolsky assured that Abaza-pasha should have set out to Kamyanets on the past Monday, as Kantymyr had sent his horde, though didn't turn up himself. The next day the pasha reached the border in Khotyn and occupied an old Osman II's camp beside the Khotyn fortress. Konetspolsky was already bored to stay in Kamyanets, his forces "would be glad to meet with him as soon as possible", meaning Abaza-pasha. Indeed, the Polish army was by no means deprived of the provisions problem, and there was nothing good in staying in the camp for so long in the cold weather, either (p. 156-157). On 19 October the Bujack (Belgorod) horde led by Kantymyr's sons and Orak-morza crossed the Dniester near Khotyn, and the next day they undertook a contact reconnaissance, though rather unsuccessful.

On 22 October at dawn the Turkish army crossed the Dniester not far from Khotyn, with the heavy artillery left back in the camp. Then for 5 hours they headed to Kamyanets and at about noon emerged in front of the forces of Rzeczpospolita. Abaza-pasha's ambassadors had come somewhat earlier, demanding on his behalf to disband the Zaporizhyan Cossacks, annihilate some of the Ukrainian towns etc., for these are the only conditions on which the peace could be made. In his letter of 22 October Abaza-pasha emphasized that his actions were based upon the sultan's order, as Poland was said to neglect peace since the rule of sultan Suleyman I Kanuni (ruled in 1520-1566). The pasha wrote also that he required a face-to-face encounter with

Konetspolsky and promised to send some of his important people as hostages. The hetman replied only the next day, ignoring Abaza-pasha's accusations and demanding to release the ambassadors (p. 162-165). As Abaza-pasha's requirements were deliberately unacceptable, on 22 October the hetman led his forces to the field at once, with a fortified camp left in the rear, and the banks of the Smotrych along with the well-fortified redoubts with the artillery on the right-hand side of the right wing. Soon they reached the main hill with the fort and there stayed an additional dragoon company consisting of 150 soldiers under command of a French infantryman from Nevers, Captain Jean Marion. The latter was a fairly well-known military engineer who had arrived in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth during the rule of King Sigismund III. Marion participated in the war of Khotyn in 1621, then in crushing of the Cossacks' rebellions, was a member of campaigns against the horde. Later (in 1635) he became the captain of garrison in the Kodak fortress, and in August of that very year he was killed by hetman Ivan Sulyma's rebels. The fact that the battle dispositions of the Polish forces extended for 1.5 km long and 1 km wide proved the hetman's defensive attitude, similar to Hodkevych's defence of Khotyn in 1621.

The Turks took the offensive, but crown mounted troops didn't accept the battle and decoying the attackers all of a sudden in the firing from the ambushes. According to an Armenian chronicler, who stayed in Kamyanets, about 7000 Turks died in that fire (an obvious exaggeration). But Abaza-pasha had to form up his troops over again and place the artillery and the infantry in the front. The main blow was struck to the fort, several times by order of Abaza-pasha who was standing just in front of it, the Turks were trying to take it by storm, but every time they retreated with the losses (500 killed and a vast number of the injured), moreover, the two other forts added to the fire. The janissaries tried to break the Cossacks' ranks, the spahi even managed to slip between the Cossack camp and the Smotrych but there they were destroyed or thrown down into the river by the Cossacks and Janush Vyshnevetsky's warriors. The latter stroke at the flanks of the advancing Moldavians and Wallachs, and they retreated at once.

The main battle actions developed in the left flank. As the evening grew nearer, the pasha (or bey) of Vidin started a new storm, leading a couple thousand horsemen, followed by the main forces and the horde. He managed to press back the front units of Vyshnevetsky and some other commanders, the regiment of the mayor of Zhydachiv Jan Odjyvol'sky, but the crown troops fired volleys from the camp as well as from the redoubt in the flanks, Konet'spolsky took the offensive and those Turks, who had managed to squeeze in, found themselves open to the attacks from the three sides, so they began to retreat, suffering massive losses – a lot of them were killed, wounded or captured. In that battle died, among others, Ali-bey of Vezem, Kantymyr's son-in-law, brother and son; Abaza-pasha's nephew Ipsyr-bey was injured, Abaza-pasha himself had his left-hand thumb wounded, and his horse was killed. Konet'spolsky hadn't yet even brought his two rear echelons into play. Abaza-pasha was astonished by the heavy losses of his troops and halted the attack (p. 170-171). At the same time, Konet'spolsky floated a rumor that he had 20 thousand Cossacks at his disposal, and was awaiting for 15 more thousand led by the mayor of Vinnytsya to join them. The heavy defeat, the news of oncoming Cossacks and, especially, of King Vladyslav's victory at Smolensk were the reasons the Turks lost their fighting spirit, and they hurried to retreat. The battle of Kamyanets-Podil'sky showed an undeniable advantage of Rzeczpospolita's new tactics over the East's. Firearms, not the sabres, made the battle.

Retreating, the Turkish army continued to foray new settlements of Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth along the border of the Dniester, hoping that if they seize them, it would help to pretend Abaza-pasha had won the war, which would protect them from the Sultan's rage. The horde set to sacking the towns, while the Moldavian and Wallachian troops abandoned Abaza-pasha, so his forces were considerably reduced (to 15 thousand). The town which suffered the most powerful blow from the pasha was Studenytsya – a new small town ruled by the voyevoda of Bratslav S. Pototsky and inhabited by the Cossacks. On 24 October Ipsyr Mostafa and Suleiman-aga began the storm of Studenytsya, defended by a couple hundred Cossacks and local

peasants. Though the fort, which in fact was fenced by the paling, wasn't well fortified and didn't have any cannons, it managed to stand the three-day siege and took the lives of many Turks, including Kiyayeri-pasha, the commander of the janissaries company from Edirne. Only when the defenders had ran out of gunpowder and other ammunition, the Turks ceased the town and slaughtered them. Abaza-pasha was quick to make, as Konetspolsky himself said, "a mountain out of a molehill" and submitted a success report to the Sultan. He also sent him a couple of spears taken out of the killed and the wounded Turks' bodies and the town flag of Studenytsya, but this message of his was intercepted by Konetspolsky's people (p. 191). The pasha chose to take the wish for the reality and wrote a success report to Sultan, sent him 200 peasants from the Moldavian and Wallachian prisons, pretending them to be the captives, and ordering to shave their faces and dress them in the Polish manner beforehand. Moreover, he even sent to Sultan a beautiful girl later, probably it was Rypsima – the daughter of the head of Studenytsya, claiming her to be Konetspolsky's daughter.

When the news of Studenytsya's defeat reached Konetspolsky on 27 October, he commanded to pursue the enemy and floated a rumor about the enormous Cossack army. Under cover of darkness twenty Cossacks stole into the Turkish camp, where they opened fire, captured some enemy soldiers for interrogation and raised a panic among the Turks. This proved to Abaza-pasha that the rumors were true and he moved on in the direction of Mohyliv-Podilsky. On their way the Turks seized two more villages, but then left the borders of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. In his turn, Konetspolsky, stimulated by success, didn't rule out the possibility to continue the war in the grounds of Moldavia, especially as the ruler of that place asked to strike a blow at the Turkish fortress Tighina (Bender), however, a fear of defeat, just like it had happened in the battle of Tsetsora in 1620, held him back.

Meanwhile, the geopolitical situation continued to change in favour of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth: the army of Muscovy was defeated in the battle of Smolensk, the Shah of Iran seized the fortress of Van. The Sultan had to pursue a more careful policy, the "emirs" were sent to Abaza-pasha to tell him to leave the

Polish-Lithuanian grounds. All of this was described in a letter of Konetspolsky to King Vladyslav IV of 27 October (p. 166-168). On 2 November Abaza-pasha appealed to Konetspolsky with a peace proposal. The pasha put a brave face on a sorry business, though, assuring that he was doing it only on his rulers' request, but as a matter of fact, by this he acknowledged his defeat. Abaza-pasha was afraid that the crown army would exploit their success and move the military operations to the Ottoman Empire (p. 171-173). That very day he received a sharp respond from Konetspolsky, who wrote victoriously to Abaza-pasha. The hetman considered the seizure of Studenytsya to be a shameful act and threatened to cross the boundaries of Rzechpospolita as soon as the Zaporizhyan Army came. Konetspolsky wrote about the oncoming Cossacks to some other of his addressees, expecting, and not without reason, this news to cause a serious alarm in the Turkish camp (p. 174-175).

On 5 November (staying already in the Zhabintsy camp) Konetspolsky described the course of events in his letter to Vladyslav IV. According to his data, Abaza-pasha had retreated from Studenytsya in the direction of Tighina, in order to destroy all the towns above the Dniester on his way. But, having heard the news that Konetspolsky and his crown forces had planned to go to Moldavia and that "a great number of the Ukrainians (Ukraincow) and a part of the Zaporizhyan Cossacks had been moving closer to us along the Dniester", he offered the peace on behalf of his rulers and sent to the hetman his representative Suleiman accompanied by the Polish herald Sulishevsky and a representative of a Moldavian ruler – a logothete (chancellor) (p. 179 – 182). The King approved of the crown hetman's actions and asked him not to give the Cossacks any occasion to raise a rebellion, which would now serve the Turks' purpose (p. 185).

Abazi-pasha eventually retreated across Dunai and arranged his army in Braili, Galazi and Valask cities so that they could fight the Rychch Pospolita army if necessary. At the same time he did not rule out the possibility of a new campaign against Rech Pospolita in the spring of 1634; such an arrangement of the Turkish army was, therefore, very convenient for him. Abazi pasha himself made the journey from

rushchuk to Istanbul in four days! Various dignitaries, including some of the muslim clergy followed him to the capital. They were to confirm that the Turkish army had indeed conquered Kamianets-Podilsky. Bribes were used; evidently Abaza-pasha had a hand in imprisoning the Kostiantinopil patriarch Kyryl I Lukaris, who was a patriarch between the years of 1620 and 1638. The sultan made Abaza-pasha serdar (commander) and gave him full discretion in the matter of war and peace concerning Rich Pospolita. Pasha was supposed to return from Istanbul with a newly appointed Moldovian master Vasyl Lupu (p. 205-206). But his mission to the capital had an only temporary success. It is true, however, that the sultan had supposedly extended his reign from the Black Sea to Buda, giving him the Moldovian, Talas, Bulgarian and Bosnian lands, which led Abaza pasha to plan a new war for the spring of 1634, a war in which Rich Pospolita would be conquered but also German lands and even Rome! (p. 211). But after the departure of pasha from Istanbul, as early as January of 1634, sultan's 'emirs' were sent that forbade him from beginning a new war against Rich Pospolita (p. 208). This war in the face of yet another Turkish-Persian conflict and the problems with the Krymski khanate was not desired by Murad IV. Abaza pasha, being one of the leaders of the military party, found himself in an ambivalent position and had no idea what to do. He sent for Bairan pasha to join him with his troops while he hurried to Adrianopol (Edirne) and Istanbul, where the sultan was supposed to be (p. 213). The Moscow diplomats became active too and prodded Abaza pasha to start a new war against Rich Pospolyta.

This caused anxiety for Vladyslav IV and S. Konetspolsky and then it was decided to increase pressure on the sultan. It was for this purpose that O.Tshebinsky headed for Istanbul. But Abaza pasha intercepted the ambassador in late January – early February of 1634 in Provadia, a city that is forty kilometers from Varna. Later the ambassador continued on his way and on the eleventh of February met Abaza pasha in Kirkklis, a city that is fifty kilometers east of Edirne. The ambassador was welcomed by Mehmed-bey Kirkklis (as though Abaza pasha himself was present incognito among this escort), and on the third day an audience by Abaza pasha took

place. It's worth mentioning that the latter used the word 'Ukraine' during the negotiations. (p. 211). The next audience was held in the morning of 15 February, after which Abaza pasha set out to Istanbul incognito (p. 225). The ambassador arrived later and again met with pasha on the 2, 4, 5, and 6 March. The last time the ambassador was received not only by Abaza pasha but also kaimankan Kinan pasha and kapudan pasha Jafar, and a bit later by the sultan himself (p. 228). It was then that the ambassador found out that Abaza pasha, 'who rules over all', was, on the fifth of March, was proposed by the sultan as 'silistriy beglerbey' (p. 229). This could only mean a new war...

In early March 1634, Abaza pasha managed to convince the sultan of his victory; he claimed, besides, that he had been able to defeat the crown army and drive it to Kamianets, seize a number of fortresses (p. 214-215). This again led to success and that is why ambassadors of Rich Pospolyta warned the king and the hetman about the danger of a new war. Konetspolsky wrote with alarm on 22 March, 1634 about the new preparations for Abaza pasha's war, who 'is a thread not only to all viziers but to the entire Turkish people' (p. 216-217). The situation was deteriorating. Yezuit Georgiy Trampchinsky wrote on 16 April from Kamianets: 'the Moldovian land is overrun with Tartars and they are allied with Yassi; these unwelcome guests will soon be at our door. The Turks are also stirring...' (p. 233). On 2 April, 1634, the sultan himself was to set out from Istanbul to Edirne in order to assemble an army, either an army with which he was to go against Rich Pospolita himself or one that he planned to have Abaza pasha head (p. 234). In this case, the route of the campaign lay again toward Kamianets. However, wise caution held Murad IV back and he definitively refused to engage in this war. Then the peace party prevailed, so Abaza pasha was forced to assume a secondary place. Evidently the sultan had by that time fully untangled the lies of Abaza pasha concerning the results of the campaign from the previous year. Ambassador O. Tshebinsky testified to the difficult situation of Abaza pasha, who was 'in a fuss, running around, grabbing and beheading his servants that stole from people, because his neck is on the line. The sultan is stern, all fear him...'.

The conflict with Kantimir, who had written to the sultan telling him not to believe what Abaza pasha told him, also increased.

Thus, in April of 1634, a Turkish ambassador, bosnian pasha Sahin-aga, set out for Rich Pospolyta to conclude a peace agreement. He was accompanied by O.Tshebinsky. On the way from Istanbul they were supposed to visit Abaza pasha (p. 232). The latter hoped for a change in the sultan's policy and did not give up on his hopes to use force to resolve the problem. It was all the more true because he had a desired reason: the Zaporozhtsi attacked Balchik, Bilgorod (Akerman), Izmail, Shaba, and frightened Istanbul as well. In early June of 1634 an army of Salmash-murzi was concentrated at the borders and Konetspolsky was anticipating its attack on Podillia. With it, Abazi pasha could attempt a revenge too (p. 237). On 8 June, the sultan and his army set out from Eridne to reach the banks of Dunai on the 28th. That was when ordintsi were to cross Dnister. Abaza pasha, who was in the last successful stages of his career, was to command the Turkish army directly. The sultan wrote letters to the moldovian master telling him to prepare for war against Rich Pospolita; in this letter he declared his intention to establish 'his capital' in Kamianets, naming Abaza pasha 'his faithful servant' (p. 241). The latter even procured from the sultan a pardon for Murtazi pasha, offering a large sum of money for him. The pardoned man began to command the army along with Abaza pasha. On 16 June 1634, Abaz pasha wrote a threat letter to Konetspolsky from Edirne, demanding punishment for those who disturbed peace and threatening to start a new war (p. 242-243). Hetman was again forced to hurry to Kamianets Podilsky with his army as his presence there was needed for both defense of the region and establishing peace (p. 258).

However, the sultan's enthusiasm was dampened by news of Polyanovsky peace having been concluded with Moskoviyeya (June 1634), which was beneficial for Rich Pospolyta. Now Rich Pospolyta could use all its resources to defend Podillia and the sultan was forced to accept this and look for ways for peace. The militant Abaza pasha was becoming an extremely undesirable figure as he could provoke a war, which was not at all desirable for the Osman Empire. Mavr had done his job and

was to leave on 22 August, 1634. Abaz pasha was choked by order of the sultan... News of Abaz pasha's execution soon reached Rich Pospolyta. Vladislav IV wrote to Konetspolsky that Abaz pasha's execution 'eased difficulties and averted further dangers' (p. 264).

Indeed, in early September 1634 Murtaza pasha wrote Konetspolsky a letter in a different key. He called Abaz pasha 'the reason of the breakdown in the peace negotiation' because the sultan removed him from power and appointed Ali pasha, a former ruler of Egypt, in his place. Ali pasha was given Buda, Ochakiv, Tartar hordes and all border troops as well as Sylistria. Abaza pasha's removal from power opened a road to lasting peace between Rich Pospolita and the osman Empire, which Murtaza pasha made clear (p. 252). Although king Vladyslav IV was already thinking about a Turkish war, about an alliance of Rich Pospolyta with Moldavia and Transilvania, Szym accepted agreements according to which Konetspolsky had no right to touch Turkey and to cross the border on the Dnister. Under these circumstances, both sides quickly reached an agreement that was concluded in September of 1634 in Kamianets Podilsky. In this agreement the Turks promised (though they did not keep their promise) to remove ordynets from Budjak and to place candidates that had been previously recommended by the king of rich Pospolyta on Moldavian and Valas thrones. Europe was informed of this event and at least four 'flying leaves' (two German, one Belgian, and one Spanish) and the famous Italian typographer Lodovico Grigniani. One of the 'flyingn leaves' (*Copia eines Schreibens...*) contained a copy of the letter from the royal camp near Kamianets dating 22 September 1634, and the other (*Frohliche und gewisse Zeitung...*), published in Gdansk in a printing house of Andreas Gunefeld, recounted the news of the results of the Turkish campaign. Luka Meerbek then published in Brussels a relation in Latin about the rebuff of the Turkish-Nogai raid on Podillia (*Vladislai Poloniae regis victoria...*); and a year later, Francisco Martinets published in Madrid a not so credible report about a peace agreement concluded by Rich Pospolyta Polyanovskogo and Kamianets Podilsky (*Relation de los felicez sucesos de Ladislao IV...*). Grigniani praised Rich

Pospolyta's victory at Kamianets Podilsky in two not dissimilar relations that were published in Rome in 1634 ('Vera relatione...').

Abaza pasha continued to be mentioned in the correspondance between the osman Empire and Rich Pospolyta, while the Turkish side (the sultan, the Viziers, Kinan pasha and others) always presented the case so that it seemed like the deceased had waged war on his own initiative and without the sultans will or consent (p. 295). This was not true, however, the name of Abaza pasha was little by little forgotten and the Polish side did not comment on these inadequate excuses. Abaza pasha was remembered less and less often.... Thus, according to the report of a Polish agent in Istanbul to Konetspolsky, on 23 February 1638, after yet another attempt at a Palace coup in Istambul some Sech, who was a servant of Abaza pasha, 'who had shown him the way to evil and now had begun to agitate the army against the sultan' was beheaded (p. 486). Only Polish chroniclers and writers, Turkish annalists and others mentioned Abaza pasha. So S.Tvardovsky, in his poem 'Knaz Janush Vyshnevetsky' talked about the participation of this knaz in the was against Abaza pasha at the walls of Kamianets Podilsky. Still today there is a discrepancy in the definition of the character of this phenomenon (from 'Polish-Turkish war' to 'Abaza pasha's venture'). In our opinion, this was a real war, which Abaza pasha had begun not unbeknownst to the sultan and had he been victorious, the victor would not have been judged. However, he had been defeated and consequently became the scapegoat for the sultan and the osman Empire's government. The war or campaign started by him was an important page in the history of Europe and has a direct connection to Ukraine and, above all, to Kamianets-Podilsky.

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